The Scarcity You Were Paying For

Local intelligence and peer-to-peer distribution are about to strip the subscription economy down to the one thing it was always charging for: access to resources that are no longer scarce.

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AI Summary By 2028, households will begin cutting nearly every service they subscribe to because local AI running on ordinary laptops will cover roughly 80% of everyday entertainment and digital consumption, and peer-to-peer infrastructure will return ownership and economic value directly to creators and consumers. …
  • By 2028, households will begin cutting nearly every service they subscribe to because local AI running on ordinary laptops will cover roughly 80% of everyday entertainment and digital consumption, and peer-to-peer infrastructure will return ownership and economic value directly to creators and consumers.
  • The subscription economy was built on three scarcities that are now expiring: computing power that required data centers, distribution networks controlled by platforms, and access to catalogs locked behind subscription walls.
  • The capability gap between open-weight models running on consumer hardware and frontier models in data centers has narrowed to about four months, and most everyday digital tasks like summarizing news, generating stories, or tutoring do not require frontier-level performance.
  • A household spending $111 per month per adult on subscriptions pays over $1,300 per year for access it will never own, while a capable laptop represents a one-time purchase that shifts digital costs from perpetual rent to capital expense, favoring households with savings.
  • Peer-to-peer protocols can eliminate the intermediary's cut by allowing payments to flow directly from consumers to creators, removing the economic justification for platforms that extract percentages while contributing no creative work themselves.

Be glad if you live beneath your means, because what is coming will test even a conservative margin. The next three years will not be a gentle repricing of digital life. They will be a demolition of the layer of the economy that sits between people and the things they make, watch, hear, and know, and demolitions are hard on everyone standing near the building, including the people who were only renting space in it.

By 2028, households will begin cutting nearly every service they subscribe to, and two offerings that barely register in today's market will be the reason.

  • The first is local AI capable of covering roughly 80% of everyday entertainment and digital consumption on hardware no more powerful than an ordinary laptop.
  • The second is peer-to-peer infrastructure that removes the advertising model and returns ownership, control, and economic value to the people who create and consume content.

Neither one alone breaks the subscription economy. Together they remove the three scarcities it was built on.

A Bill That Keeps Rising for the Same Thing

The average American adult now spends $111 a month on subscriptions, up from $90 a year earlier, and roughly $21 of that goes to services nobody uses.1 At the household level, the number is larger and the cause is plainer: average monthly digital subscription spending reached $169.70 in the second quarter of 2026, up 10.6% year over year, driven primarily by higher prices rather than by households adding services.2 People are paying more for the same access. Netflix's standard ad-free plan now costs $19.99 a month and its premium tier $26.99, against $8.99 for the tier that carries advertising.3

Consumers have noticed.
Forty-three percent say they are likely to cancel at least one streaming service within three months, and 52% have already canceled or downgraded one because of a price increase.4 Only 24% of video streaming subscribers report no recent subscription fatigue, down from 37% in 2023.5

The platforms have noticed too.
Average price increases across Netflix, Disney+, and Prime Video fell from 24% of the prior price in 2023/24 to 14% in 2025/26, and the increases that did land fell unevenly: ad-free tiers rose $1.62 on average against $1.21 for ad-supported ones, widening the gap between them, because advertising has become the more important revenue line.6 Comscore's 2025 report put the ad tier at 45% of Netflix's US household viewing, against 34% a year earlier.7

That is what a mature toll booth looks like. The customer pays either in dollars or in data, and the intermediary keeps the spread either way.

Price increases have hit the ceiling of willingness to pay, so the operator shifts to charging advertisers for the attention of the people who refused to pay more. The model survives only as long as the customer has no other road.

The Death of Digital Rent

Three Scarcities, All Expiring

The subscription economy was built on three scarcities, and every one of them is becoming a commodity.

Computing was scarce because serious processing lived in data centers only large companies could afford.

Distribution was scarce because reaching millions of people required networks, licensing deals, and storefronts owned by a handful of platforms.

Access was scarce because the catalog itself sat behind those platforms, licensed under terms the consumer never saw and could never own.

When the marginal cost of producing, processing, and distributing content approaches zero, the justification for charging a consumer every month for access collapses. A recurring fee makes sense for a recurring cost. It makes far less sense for something that costs nothing to deliver one more time and that the customer can produce, or retrieve, on a machine they already own.

Intelligence Moves Onto the Desk

Consumer GPU model gap
Epoch AI Creative Commons BY license
The capability gap between what runs in a data center and what runs at home has been closing on a schedule. Epoch AI found that models small enough to run on a single consumer GPU typically match frontier capability after a lag of six to twelve months across four benchmarks, driven by open-weight models scaling compute at roughly the same pace as closed ones, by distillation compressing larger models with little loss, and by each new GPU generation fitting a larger model locally.8

The thresholds are concrete: about 28 billion parameters on an RTX 4090, about 40 billion on a 5090, at four-bit weights.9 Measured on Epoch's capability index rather than on hardware, the best open-weight models have run an average of four months behind the closed frontier since January 2026, a gap of eight index points.10

The hardware targets are now explicit. Google shipped Gemma 4 in April 2026 in four sizes, built to run and fine-tune on everything "from billions of Android devices worldwide, to laptop GPUs," with the two smallest intended to run offline on a phone.11 Google's own memory table puts the smallest at 2.9 GB of weights at four-bit precision and the next at 4.5 GB.12 Those are laptop numbers, published by the vendor.

The gap at the top is still real, and it is not a licensing gap.

The strongest coding model you can run on one consumer graphics card scores 68.0% on SWE-bench Verified; the top of the same leaderboard, measured on the same harness, scores 97.0%.1314 But the two models immediately behind that leader, at 96.4% and 95.4%, ship their weights openly and still need a data center to run. What separates the desk from the frontier is not who owns the model. It is how much memory the model needs, which makes the price of memory the whole question.15

That gap matters for building software and for frontier research. It does not matter for summarizing the news, generating a bedtime story, tutoring a child through algebra, narrating a long article aloud, composing background music, editing photos, answering a medical-terminology question, or holding a conversation.

Most everyday digital consumption is not frontier work. It is ordinary work done at volume, and ordinary work is exactly what a laptop-class model now handles.

The relevant threshold was never parity with the best model in the world. It was good enough for the thing a person was paying $10 a month to have done.

The irony is that AI subscriptions are themselves the fastest-growing line on the bill. Americans who pay for AI tools average four of them at almost $66 a month, and a quarter of those subscribers spend more than $100.16 That spend is the most exposed of all, because it is renting a capability that is being given away in open weights with a lag measured in months.

The Toll Moves From Monthly to Upfront

Local AI models
The obstacle is hardware, and in 2026 it is a serious one. Gartner projects the combined price of DRAM and solid-state storage will rise about 130% by the end of 2026 against 2025 levels, pushing average PC prices up 17% and smartphone prices up 13%, with memory climbing to 23% of a PC's bill of materials from 16%.17 TrendForce revised its first-quarter DRAM contract forecast up to a 90–95% quarterly increase and expects prices to stay high through 2028.18 The same AI buildout that makes local intelligence possible is making the machine to run it more expensive.

That does not stop the shift. It changes the shape of the payment.

A household spending $111 a month per adult on subscriptions is spending more than $1,300 a year per person on access it will never own. A capable laptop, even at inflated 2026 prices, is a one-time purchase that keeps working after the payment stops. The cost of digital life moves from a perpetual rent to a capital expense, and capital expenses favor households with savings.

This is where living beneath your means stops being a virtue and becomes a position.

The household with cash can buy the machine and stop the bleed. The household living at the edge of its income keeps renting, keeps paying the annual increases, and keeps funding the intermediaries the longest.19 The machine that ends the rent is getting more expensive at the cheap end faster than anywhere else, and the cheap end is where that household shops.

The exit is being priced out from the bottom. Gartner expects worldwide PC shipments to fall 10.4% in 2026 as memory costs pass through to retail, and its senior director analyst Ranjit Atwal puts the end point plainly: "Ultimately, we expect the sub-$500 entry-level PC segment will disappear by 2028."20

That is the same year the subscription cuts start. The household that most needs a one-time purchase to replace a monthly one is the household whose price tier is scheduled to stop existing.

Distribution Without a Landlord

Rent seeking web
Local intelligence handles what a person consumes alone. Peer-to-peer infrastructure handles everything that moves between people, and it attacks the second pillar of the current model: the intermediary's cut.

Music is the cleanest example of what that cut costs. Spotify pools subscription and advertising revenue and, by its own account, pays out roughly two-thirds of music revenue to rights holders.21 It also insists that no service pays a fixed amount per stream, because listeners do not pay per stream — the per-stream figure is total payouts divided by total streams after the fact, and in 2026 that arithmetic lands between $0.003 and $0.005.22

Spotify paid more than $11 billion to the industry in 2025, bringing lifetime payouts to nearly $70 billion, with roughly half generated by independent artists and labels.23 Its head of music, Charlie Hellman, says the platform "accounts for roughly 30% of recorded music revenue"; 13,800 artists cleared $100,000 on it last year and 1,500 cleared a million.24

Important

Before any label takes its share, a million streams is worth a few thousand dollars to the people who made the work. The platform does not compose, perform, or record anything. Its product is the index, the delivery, and the payment rail, and every one of those is something a protocol can do without a company in the middle.

The protocols already exist. The AT Protocol behind Bluesky makes the account an identifier the host does not own: the stated design goal is that "changing a provider should not cause a user to lose their identity, social graph, or content," and the migration path moves the repository, the media, and the preferences to a new server while the identifier itself keeps pointing at the user.25 Bluesky passed 47 million registered users in October 2026.26 Its mobile monthly active users fell 27% year over year to 10.4 million by June, and the quarterly average has halved since the end of 2024.27

Important

Portable identity is solved technology. What has not arrived is an economic reason to leave, because a decentralized feed is still, to the user, just another feed.

The flip comes when the protocol carries money as well as posts: when a listener's payment reaches the artist directly, when a reader's subscription goes to the writer and not a platform, when the creator's audience is an asset they hold rather than a list the platform rents back to them. At that point the advertising model has nothing to sell, because there is no centralized audience to package.28

What Disappears

Put the two together and the list of things consumers no longer need to pay for gets long.

  • No centralized gatekeeper deciding what is available.
  • No mandatory subscription to reach a catalog.
  • No intermediary extracting a percentage of every transaction.
  • No business model that depends on harvesting attention and personal information to compensate for prices that have hit their ceiling.

The next major disruption will not be AI replacing jobs one role at a time.

It will be AI eliminating entire layers of economic intermediation that people have been conditioned to treat as permanent: the aggregator, the storefront, the licensing middleman, the ad network, the recommendation engine that exists mainly to keep a subscriber from canceling.

Warning

Those layers employ a great many people and anchor a great deal of market value. Their contraction will be felt in paychecks and portfolios well before it shows up as savings on a credit card statement.29 That is the second reason to keep a margin.

The disruption arrives as an income shock for some households at the same time it arrives as a cost reduction for others, and nobody gets to choose which side they are on in advance.3031

The Monopoly Is Not the Moat

Companies that mistake their distribution monopolies for durable competitive advantages are about to learn how quickly consumers leave when the road reopens. Streaming already shows the behavior in miniature: subscribers churn out, wait for a full season, binge it, and cancel again. That is not loyalty to a platform. It is tolerance of a toll for one piece of content, and tolerance ends the day the content is reachable another way.

The durable businesses on the other side will be the ones that sell something a protocol cannot replicate: the work itself, the hardware it runs on, or the expertise to make the local stack useful. The ones that sold access will find that access was the scarce thing, and that it is not scarce anymore. Take the Netflix plan that rose from $17.99 to $19.99 this year. When the household that pays it can generate most of an evening's entertainment on a machine it already owns, and pay the few creators it actually values directly, the question will not be whether $19.99 is too much.

It will be what, exactly, the $19.99 was ever buying.

Footnotes

  1. CNET 2026 subscription survey, via 10News — $111 a month per adult, up from $90 a year earlier, with $21 of it on unused services. Sample size and fieldwork dates are not reported. ↩
  2. Digital Content Next, Q2 2026 Digital Subscription Tracking Report — $169.70 average monthly household spend, up 10.6% year over year. DCN attributes the rise "primarily to higher subscription prices," not to added services. ↩
  3. Netflix, current US plans and prices — Netflix's own plan page: Standard with ads $8.99, Standard $19.99, Premium $26.99. The increase landed in March 2026. ↩
  4. Reviews.org, Streaming Fatigue Report 2026 — 43% plan to cancel a streaming service in the next three months and 52% have canceled or downgraded one over a price increase. Survey of 1,000 Americans, published June 22, 2026. ↩
  5. CivicScience on subscription fatigue — 24% of video streaming subscribers report no recent subscription fatigue, down from 37% in 2023. ↩
  6. Ampere Analysis, via Advanced Television — Average increases across Netflix, Disney+ and Prime Video fell from 24% of the prior price in 2023/24 to 14% in 2025/26. Ad-free tiers rose $1.62 on average against $1.21 for ad-supported ones. ↩
  7. Comscore, 2025 State of Streaming — Released October 29, 2025: 45% on Netflix's ad-supported tier against 34% a year earlier. The release's subtitle gives the base as US Netflix households and its body as household viewing hours. ↩
  8. Epoch AI, models that fit on consumer GPUs — Leading open models runnable on one consumer GPU "typically match the capabilities of frontier models after an average lag between 6-12 months," across GPQA Diamond, MMLU-Pro, Artificial Analysis Intelligence and LM Arena. Epoch adds that small open models are more likely to be benchmark-optimized, so the real-world lag runs somewhat longer. ↩
  9. Epoch AI, the consumer-GPU size ceiling — The same analysis sets the runnable ceiling at roughly 28B parameters in the RTX 4090 era and 40B in the 5090 era, assuming four-bit weights and an 8K context. ↩
  10. Epoch AI, open versus closed capability gap — "Since January 2026, the most capable open-weight models have lagged frontier closed models by an average of four months" on the Epoch Capabilities Index, a gap of eight index points. ↩
  11. Google, introducing Gemma 4 — Published April 2, 2026 in four sizes — E2B, E4B, 26B MoE and 31B dense — sized to run on hardware "from billions of Android devices worldwide, to laptop GPUs." Google says E2B and E4B "run completely offline with near-zero latency" on phones. ↩
  12. Google AI for Developers, Gemma 4 memory requirements — Google's own table gives 2.9 GB for E2B and 4.5 GB for E4B at four-bit precision. Weights plus loading overhead only, excluding the KV cache. ↩
  13. Mistral, Devstral 2 and Vibe CLI — Devstral Small 2, 24B under Apache 2.0, scores 68.0% on SWE-bench Verified and is built for single-GPU operation, including CPU-only. The 123B Devstral 2 scores 72.2% and needs at least four H100-class GPUs. ↩
  14. Vals AI, SWE-bench Verified leaderboard — As of September 1, 2026, scored on one bash-only harness: Claude Opus 5 at 97.0%, DeepSeek V4 Pro at 96.4%, GLM 5.3 at 95.4%. Vals has archived the benchmark as saturated. ↩
  15. Where the Equation Flips — The Local Tier, part one, in Aizia: the local-versus-cloud line moved, and total parameters stopped being the axis it moves along. ↩
  16. Bango, The Rise of the AI Subscriber — Published November 19, 2025: paying AI subscribers average "almost $66 per month across 4 different AI tools," and 24% spend over $100 a month. The base is existing subscribers, not all adults. ↩
  17. Gartner, February 26, 2026 forecast — A 130% rise in combined DRAM and SSD prices by end-2026 against 2025 levels, raising PC prices 17% and smartphone prices 13%, with memory reaching 23% of a PC's bill of materials from 16%. Gartner's own release blocks automated retrieval; figures quoted here as reported by Back End News. ↩
  18. TrendForce, via The Register — First-quarter 2026 DRAM contract prices revised to a 90-95% quarterly rise, up from a 55-60% forecast in January. "Prices are expected to remain high through 2028." ↩
  19. This Is Not a K-Shaped Economy. It Is an L-Shaped One. — The Compression Series, part one: a small slice compounding speed and leverage while much of the public is pressed into managed stagnation rather than onto a lower branch. ↩
  20. Gartner on the entry-level PC segment — Worldwide PC shipments projected to fall 10.4% in 2026, and senior director analyst Ranjit Atwal: "Ultimately, we expect the sub-$500 entry-level PC segment will disappear by 2028." ↩
  21. Spotify, Loud & Clear FAQ — Spotify's own page: "Like every major streaming service, Spotify pays out roughly two-thirds of music revenue to rights holders." ↩
  22. TuneCore, Spotify per-stream payouts in 2026 — Puts the computed average at $0.003 to $0.005 per stream. Spotify's own FAQ states that no service pays a fixed amount per stream and that the rate is derived from total payouts divided by total streams. ↩
  23. Spotify, Loud & Clear 2026 takeaways — More than $11 billion paid in 2025, bringing lifetime payouts to nearly $70 billion, with "roughly half of royalties generated by independent artists and labels." ↩
  24. Charlie Hellman on Spotify's share of industry revenue — Spotify's Head of Music, on the 2026 Loud & Clear report: "Today, Spotify accounts for roughly 30% of recorded music revenue." The same report puts 13,800 artists over $100,000 in 2025 and 1,500 over $1 million. ↩
  25. AT Protocol identity and account migration — The protocol's own identity guide states the design goal: "Changing a provider should not cause a user to lose their identity, social graph, or content." The migration guide moves the repository, media blobs and preferences, then updates the DID document to the new host. ↩
  26. Bluesky registered accounts — Over 47 million registered users as of October 14, 2026. ↩
  27. TechCrunch, citing Similarweb — August 11, 2026: "Bluesky's mobile app had 10.4 million monthly active users worldwide in June 2026, down 27.2% year-over-year." The quarterly average fell from 22.1 million in Q4 2024 to 10.7 million in Q2 2026, about 52%. ↩
  28. The Road Becomes the Gate — The Gate Cycle, part three, in Symbey: the four conditions under which a road built around a gate becomes the next gate — concentration, switching costs, sole root of trust, operator discretion. ↩
  29. When AI Eats Alpha — Cheap Intelligence, part one: what happens to the return that accrued to slow analysis, poor execution and market friction once those stop being scarce. ↩
  30. Where the Displaced Return Goes — Cheap Intelligence, part two: a compressed return does not evaporate on contact, and three of its four destinations are unreachable by the person who used to collect it. ↩
  31. Who Keeps the Dividend — In MarketAlly: the division problem behind a productivity gain, and the labor share's lowest reading since 1947. ↩
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